ABSTRACT
The probability of a war initiated by Israel has probably diminished because of the constraints placed on their freedom to maneuver. Throughout Israel's history, war has been seen as an instrument for the defense of the existence of Israel and its political integrity. The non-Clausewitzian approach, the realization of the lack of direct correlation between military success and the achievement of political aims, was based on a solid understanding of the constraints on Israel's freedom of behavior. In three Arab-Israel wars, those of 1956, 1967, and 1973, surprise played an important role. The surprisingly effective use of the weapons systems would have made a preemptive air strike by Israel inconsequential. In order to launch a full-scale war, Israel's forces must be mobilized or, at the very least, be in a stage of advanced preparation for mobilization. A Syrian decision to begin military operations against Israel because of a stalemate in the political process is a permanent possibility.
