ABSTRACT
A prime delusion in addressing economic dualism is to be found in the 2013 Zimbabwe’s Constitution’s exclusion of communal lands from the general provisions of legal property rights. This preservation of the colonially inherited patronage system of traditional chiefs, has left the communal lands at the behest of administrative discretion, further creating uncertainty in the minds of any investor. The chapter concludes that it was in many ways naïve to expect change of the historically entrenched economic dualism structure, without attacking the problem at its roots. The transformation of the agrarian sector into a modern economy cannot happen as long the communal lands remain the residual sector, and lagging behind the formal sector in terms of technology, application of property rights, and market-based resource mobilisation. In many ways this is likened to the Harrod–Domar model, where saving and investment become the driving forces when it comes to economic development of underdeveloped countries. For this to happen, markets will need a network of institutions, regulations and the presence of a strong state to provide reliable and predictable environment, not the usual populist one that dishes out ‘freebies’ like food and other subsidies, particularly in times of elections.
