ABSTRACT
In several of his works, Immanuel Kant insists on the transcendental role of imagination in perception. In the Kantian scholarship, this claim has been interpreted in at least three ways: it is believed that the imagination is necessary to solve the riddle of the amodal character of perception, to justify the possibility of perceptual identity across time and to explain the possibility of perceiving particular objects as such, that is to say as belonging to a specific class of objects. This paper aims to show how E. Husserl inherited these sets problems without however having recourse to the imagination at all. In the last section, I will briefly analyse two types of mixed acts where perception and imagination unite, namely image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and what Husserl calls perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie). The argument here shows that these analyses do not contradict, but rather strengthen the argument defended throughout the paper, namely that in Husserl’s phenomenology, and contrary to Kant’s, the imagination does not assume a synthetic or transcendental function in perception.
