ABSTRACT
Evolutionary game theory provides a set of tools that can be used to model the evolution of social contracts. These models traditionally take the game individuals play as fixed and consider how behavior within this game may change over time. However, one of the most important aspects of the formation of social contracts is the evolution of the game itself. This chapter presents a method for modeling evolving games that fits within the standard methods of evolutionary game theory and applies this approach to examples relevant to the evolution of the social contract. We discuss the scope and limits of this method and contrast this way of representing evolving games with other approaches that have been considered in the past. 3.1 Introduction
Thomas Hobbes describes the formation of social contracts as rational individuals giving up their freedoms to avoid the “nasty,
brutish, and short” life in the state of nature. In the state of nature, there is no reason to trust other individuals and there is a general lack of cooperative interactions. Adopting a social contract changes individual incentives to make trust and cooperation possible.
