ABSTRACT
Contents 23.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 530 23.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 532 23.3 Single Network Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 533
23.3.1 One-Shot User-Network Interaction Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534 23.3.1.1 Equivalence to Prisoner’s Dilemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 536
23.3.2 Repeated User-Network Interaction Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539 23.3.2.1 Present Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539 23.3.2.2 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 539
23.3.3 Introducing Punishment in the Repeated Interaction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 542 23.3.4 User-Many Networks Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544
23.4 Support for Fast Session Handoffs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 545 23.4.1 Cooperative Bargaining Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 546
23.4.1.1 Equivalence to a Rubinstein Bargaining Game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 547 23.4.2 Payment Partition Based on the Nash Bargaining Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 548
23.4.3 A Bayesian Form of the Payment-Partition Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 23.4.3.1 Motivating Truthfulness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 551
23.5 Evaluating Solutions through Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 552 23.5.1 Evaluation of User-Network Interaction in Single Network Selection . . . . . . . . 552 23.5.2 Evaluation of Truthfulness in Supporting Fast Session Handoffs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 554
23.6 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555 23.7 Open Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 555 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 556
Convergence, that is, the integration of various access technologies combining their resources to best serve the increased user requirements, may be supported, through a system architecture where different access networks, terminals, and services coexist. Thus, a new, user centric communication paradigm is motivated, that is, the user is no longer bound to only one access network but may indirectly select the best available access network(s) to support a service session. Upon a new service request or even any dynamic change, for example, mobility, one (or a group) of the participating access networks needs to be selected in order to support the session. Thus, the converged system architecture must be equipped with a network selection mechanism to effectively assign the best access network(s) to handle a service session.
