ABSTRACT
In my talks about cryptology, I often say that codebreaking comprises one of the most trustworthy forms of intelligence, since it consists of the actual words of the persons targeted. In response, I’m sometimes asked whether it is not possible that some of the messages intercepted are fakes, intended to trick the eavesdroppers. My answer is two-fold. First, I say that in all my reading in the literature and in original documents I have never seen any actual phony messages that have in fact been transmitted.1 Second, I say that this void makes sense, since fake messages would probably cause more trouble than they are worth. Ordinary, nondeceptive transmissions are not infrequently misunderstood through obscurity or incompleteness: husbands and others being assigned tasks are sometimes not clear as to what wanted, which causes difficulties. So to deliberately risk a misunderstanding for a slight possible gain seems not worthwhile. Another problem, mentioned by an experienced British deception officer in World War I in opposing “the sending of dummy messages containing information, false or real, with the intention of the enemy picking it up,” is that “ere is always the danger that information that is false today may be correct a week hence, i.e. just when the enemy has succeeded in deciphering the message.”2
