ABSTRACT
I. Classification with regard to the number of players A. pairwise game B. individual game versus conspecific-group game II. Classification with regard to capabilities of players A. asymmetric game B. symmetric game III. Classification with regard to game rules A. hawk-dove game B. hawk-dove-assessor game C. hawk-dove-bourgeois game D. life-history-strategy game E. prisoner’s-dilemma game (one-shot game,
reiterated game) F. retaliator game G. rock-scissors-paper game H. territory game I. tit-for-tat game J. war-of-attrition game
ultimatum game n. A game that involves an anonymous proposer, an anonymous responder, and a windfall sum of money (Jensen et al. 2007b, 109). Comments: In this game, the proposer decides whether to divide money with the responder. If the responder accepts the offer, both players receive the proposed division. If the responder does not accept the offer, neither player gets money. The canonical economic model of pure self-interest predicts that the proposer should offer the smallest share possible, and the responder should accept any nonzero offer. Actual human behavior deviates from this prediction suggesting that a responder is sensitive to unfairness and punishes a proposer that makes an inequitable offer by rejecting it at a cost to himself. The proposer knows this and makes a strategic offer that the responder is less likely to refuse. This is the most widely recognized test for sensitivity to fairness.
