ABSTRACT

Contents 10.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 10.2 Spectrum Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

10.2.1 Current Spectrum Control Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293 10.2.2 New Spectrum-Sharing Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

10.3 Game Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 10.3.1 Basic Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294 10.3.2 Bounded Rationality and Myopic Best-Response

Updates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 296 10.4 Game Theoretical Models for Dynamic Spectrum Sharing . . . . . . . 297

10.4.1 Iterative Water-Filling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298 10.4.2 Potential Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 300 10.4.3 Supermodular Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 10.4.4 Bargaining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 10.4.5 Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307

10.4.5.1 Share Auction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 308 10.4.5.2 Share Auction Mechanisms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

10.4.6 Correlated Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310

10.5 Conclusions and Open Problems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312 List of Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313

Cognitive radio technology enables flexible and dynamic spectrum sharing among multiple radio networks and users and has the potential of greatly improving the spectrum utilization and network performance. This new communication paradigm, however, requires a new design and analysis framework targeting at highly flexible and distributed communication and networking. Game theory is very suitable for this task, because it is a comprehensive mathematical theory for modeling the interactions among distributed and intelligent rational decision makers. In this chapter, we discuss several game theoretical models/concepts that are highly relevant for spectrum sharing, including iterative water-filling, potential game, supermodular game, bargaining, auction, and correlated equilibrium. We also discuss several related open problems, such as the lack of propermodels for dynamic and incomplete information games in this area.