ABSTRACT

Validation of Human-Error Identification . . . . . . . . 128

Applying TAFEI to Interface Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Applying SHERPA to Safety Critical

Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

We are all familiar with the annoyance of errors we make with everyday devices, such as turning on the heat under on an empty kettle, or making mistakes in the programming sequence of our videocassette recorders. People have a tendency to blame themselves for “human error.” However, the use and abuse of the term has led some to question the very notion of “human error” (Wagenaar & Groeneweg, 1988). “Human error” is often invoked in the absence of technological explanations. Chapanis (1999) wrote that back in the 1940s he noted that “pilot error” was really “designer error.” This was a challenge to contemporary thinking, and showed that design is all-important in human-error reduction. Chapanis became interested in why pilots often retracted the landing gear instead of the landing flaps after landing the aircraft. He identified the problem as designer error rather than pilot error, as the designer had put two identical toggle switches side by side-one for the landing gear, the other for the flaps. Chapanis proposed that the controls should be separated and coded. The separation and coding of controls is now standard human-factors practice. Half a century after Chapanis’s original observations, the idea that one can design error-tolerant devices is beginning to gain credence (Baber & Stanton, 1994). One can argue that human error is not a simple matter of one individual making one mistake, so much as the product of a design which has permitted the existence and continuation of specific activities which could lead to errors (Reason, 1990).