ABSTRACT
We now move closer toward an implementation of the underlying theory developed in Chapter 6, using, as appropriate, the content and format of the representational knowledge described in Chapters 7 and 8. is is a challenging task, as deciding how to apply lethal force ethically is a dicult problem for people, let alone machines:
Whether deployed as peacekeepers, counterinsurgents, peace enforcers, or conventional warriors, United States ground troops sometimes make poor decisions about whether to re their weapons. Far from justifying criticism of individual soldiers at the trigger, this fact provides the proper focus for systemic improvements. e problem arises when the soldier, having been placed where the use of deadly force may be necessary, encounters something and fails to assess correctly whether it is a threat. en the soldier either shoots someone who posed no such threat, or surrenders some tactical advantage. e lost advantage may even permit a hostile element to kill the soldier or a comrade. [Martins 94]
Sometimes failure occurs because restraint is lacking (e.g., the killing of unarmed civilians in My Lai in March 1968; Somalia in February 1993;
Haditha in November 2005); in other cases it is due to the lack of initiative (e.g., the Beirut truck bombing of Marine barracks, October 1983) [Martins 94]. Martins observes that unduly inhibited soldiers, too reluctant to re their weapons, prevent military units from achieving their objectives. In Chapter 3, we observed that in World War II most infantrymen never red their weapons, including those with clear targets. Soldiers who re too readily also erect obstacles to tactical and strategic success. We must strike a delicate balance between the ability to eectively execute mission objectives and the absolute compliance that the Laws of War will be observed.
