ABSTRACT

Apart from the uncertainty of definitions in the biological context o f ‘functions’, problems arise from the implicit teleology which arises if the term is used without a prefix or an attribute. In this case ‘function’ imputes a certain non-human expediency to biological entities. Thus the corresponding question is: what is the ‘intrinsic’ purpose of natural systems? And this is a very dangerous issue. If we ignore all warning shots from the philosophy o f science and if we carefully apply Ulanowicz’s interpretation of Popper’s propensities (Ulanowicz, 1998), self-organisation, self-conservation, and autocatalysis seem to be the outcome of the interrelationships between the ecosystem-physiological (functional) biological processes. From this point o f view, ‘functions’ create orientors (specific regularities in the systems’ dynamics which are characterised by certain attractor states, see Muller and Leupelt, 1998 or Muller and Jorgensen in this volume) which may be used to indicate the state of the respective ecosystem. Therefore, the introduction of functions which could be interpreted as the imputation of purposes may be allowed as a heuristic tool in systems analysis, but only if we take a teleonomic approach instead of a teleological one. Doing this, we have to be aware that functions as purposive actions are always accompanied with normative implications. The carrier of ‘functions’ is covered

with positive connotations. Realising these traps, we furthermore have to keep in mind that ‘function’ is not causality. Functional approaches (e.g.: why is that organ good for the organism?) can be used to assist causal concepts, but they cannot replace them.