ABSTRACT
Several reports have indicated that pilots and crews frequently experience shortened sleep, reduced sleep efficiency and/or changes in sleep architecture that prevent full recovery from preceding periods of wakefulness (Bisson et al. 1993; Boll et al. 1992; Caldwell et al. 2009; Dement et al. 1986; Neville et al. 1994; Nicholson et al. 1986; Rosekind et al. 1994; Sasaki et al. 1986). Needless to say, these off-duty sleep troubles often lead to serious problems with on-the-job sleepiness (Akerstedt and Folkard 1995). Anything that disrupts the quality and quantity of restful sleep subsequently creates a potential safety hazard on the flight deck because of the fatigue that stems from heightened sleep pressure. Fatigued pilots suffer from increased lethargy and distractibility, decreased willingness to work cooperatively with other crew members, degraded ability to integrate incoming information and impaired capacity to make the higher-level cognitive decisions that are often crucial for flight safety (Drury, Ferguson and Thomas 2012; Petrie and Dawson 1997; Powell, Spencer and Petrie 2010; Ritter 1993). To make matters worse, recovery from the inadequate sleep that often leads to such problems on the flight deck is unfortunately not as rapid or straightforward as once was thought. In fact, it may take multiple days, even as long as a week to recover full alertness and performance levels after several prior days of restricted sleep lengths (Axelsson et al. 2008; Balkin et al. 2008; Banks et al. 2010; Belenky et al. 2003; Van Dongen et al. 2003). And during this time, pilots are more
susceptible to the involuntary micro-sleeps (short involuntary sleep episodes) that traditionally have been associated with acute fatigue – even during critical periods such as the time span from top-of-descent to landing (Rosekind et al. 1994).
