ABSTRACT
This chapter examines an earlier 20th-century constructivist theory of ethics, Pragmatic Constructivism, as associated especially with the writings of Dewey. Pragmatic constructivists, like other constructivist theorists, insist that the source and justification of ethical claims lies within. Pragmatic constructivists argue that many of their fellow constructivists fail to appreciate the parallels, because they too presuppose a number of the untenable dualisms their opponents assume. The pragmatic analysis of the relationship between de facto valuing and de jure judgments differs from various dispositional accounts of value. The pragmatic constructivist rejects the need for appeals in order to account for the emergence and force of obligations. Obligations are norms of conduct that are constructed and shaped by human practice. Moral principles will change in response to newly gained knowledge of nature, human nature, and actual flesh-and-blood changes in living conditions. Empirical inquiry concerning the nature of human deliberation and action in real life situations is a major focus of his analysis.
