ABSTRACT
George Berkeley’s differential treatment of theoretical entities is quite understandable, however, once it is appreciated that his Pragmatic instrumentalism is not an ontological position per se. Consider Berkeley’s discussion of the nature of illusions. Illusions are typically taken to be the paradigm case of nonveridical perceptions. In the New Theory of Vision, where the focus is on spatial perception, Berkeley stresses the importance of visual/tangible connections. In the New Theory of Vision, Berkeley goes on to point out that similar difficulties arise with the perception of comparative magnitude. Berkeley’s treatment of color is of a piece with his treatment of spatial properties. For Berkeley, veridicality of perception is a matter of correlation, not correspondence. Berkeley’s Pragmatic instrumentalism is in the running. Like the Pragmatists, Berkeley believes that his position is more realistic than the standard realist picture of the nature of scientific inquiry, semantics, and truth.
