ABSTRACT
Metaphysical problems, like all philosophical problems, arise from a sense of puzzlement. This chapter discusses the structure of arguments that purport to prove the existence of entities belonging to metaphysically interesting kinds. It describes the inference in significance arguments as obvious and trivial, as valid arguments whose first premise is established by the associated existence argument and whose second premise(s) (the universal generalisation(s)) as trivially true in at least one sense. The chapter proposes that existential proofs are what in effect are offered and defended by the friends of ϕs when advancing their ontological views properly and appropriately. It presents the debate about the existence of properties to be one pitting one metaphysician’s views and arguments against those of another metaphysician. The validity of the existence argument for the existence of a buttering is established, for Donald Davidson, by offering a semantical analysis of its premise, and by comparing that analysis with others and finding it superior to them.
