ABSTRACT
It is obvious even to the casual observer that the past 15 or so years have witnessed an explosion of interest in the cognitive psychology of autism, engendered by the appearance of a single hypothesis. All cognitive theories of autism that have emerged since the mid-1980s have been defined in relation to it. This hypothesis states that the core cognitive deficit in autism is lack of (or delayed or deviant development of) an innately specified ‘module’ for conceptualizing mental states-the socalled ‘theory of mind mechanism’ (ToMM). I will begin by assessing this position and then set it beside two further theories, one that emphasizes impairment in integrating elements into wholes (weak central coherence theory) and one that emphasizes impaired executive functioning (executive dysfunction (ED) theory.)
First, why use the term ‘theory’ of mind? Consider introspection. When we take ourselves to be (say) thinking that X or hoping that Y, we are applying concepts-the concept of thought and the concept of hope. And if we are to understand and use the English words ‘think’ and ‘hope’, we require the concepts THINK and HOPE. Moreover, mental concepts, just like any other kind of concept, require expertise in their application; and so they can be misapplied. Given this, children must acquire-perhaps they need innate cognitive apparatus to guarantee that they acquirethese concepts. Children are not, after all, taught them, any more than they are taught how to speak or to walk. Moreover, it is sometimes useful to think of concept acquisition in terms of theory acquisition, for the following reason. Some concepts are not explanatory. Thus, ‘chair’ simply means a portable seat for one. These concepts are stipulative. But certain other concepts implicitly tap into what philosophers call ‘folk theories’ of why phenomena occur. Thus, ‘Why did Moira go to the kitchen?’ Because she wanted a Martini and believed that there was a bottle of gin in the fridge. This explains why Moira did what she did in terms of two theoretical postulates and a practical inference.
