ABSTRACT
Market-based reforms of state schooling system typically view teachers as a key intermediary in the process of raising educational standards. Greater competitiveness in the school system should directly increase teacher effort through reduced job security and increased monitoring by managers and parents (Rapp 2000). In addition, schools that face greater competition will favour teachers who increase the ability of the school to recruit and retain pupils. In turn, this suggests that schools, within the constraints of any national pay system, will provide greater rewards to attract and retain the most talented teachers and be less willing to retain the least talented. A common claim is that the national pay system itself needs to be redesigned to provide teachers with greater financial incentives to adopt the objectives of their principals and prioritise improving the academic attainment levels of their pupils. Critics of present pay policies in England and Wales also argue that a single salary spine inevitably leads to recruitment problems in those subject areas where outside earnings are high, such as science and computing, or in those schools with the most challenging pupils.
