ABSTRACT
With the rise of the utility theoretical determination of value in the second half of the nineteenth century the understanding for Ricardo’s classical political economy vanished. In the appendix of his Principles, Marshall presents Ricardo as an ingenious but often awkward economist, with presentiments of his own utility-based value theory. E. Cannan’s (Marshall, [1920] 1966, p. 624 sq.; Cannan, [1893] 1967) deviating interpretation was half-hearted, the Marxian interpretation too radical; Marshall’s school dominated the English universities. In his essay of 1925 Sraffa had proved that thinking through Marshall’s theory in a rigorous way reduced it to a vague Ricardian production-cost theory. The utility theoretical determination of value was basically superfluous. With this, however, Sraffa did not intend to show that Marshall could in fact claim to be a follower of Ricardo’s. Rather, he proved that the Ricardian element in Marshall’s theory was largely incompatible with the neoclassical and that only the former was economically relevant.
