ABSTRACT
Air power, it has been said, ‘is the twentieth century’s peculiar contribution to warfare (and) continues to defy our attempts at analysis.’1 The explanation for this somewhat enigmatic statement is that the vocabulary of air power is never constant. Even apparently straightforward concepts, such as air power itself, ‘strategic bombing’, ‘command of the air’, or ‘air supremacy’ mean different things to different people. Adding to the potential for confusion is the extent to which scientific research and advanced technology have tended to concentrate on the air element of modern strategy and tactics. Much of that technology is highly esoteric and spans not merely the branch of the armed forces that traditionally operates in the air and outer space, that is to say, Air Forces, but also encompasses forces at sea and on land. Such is the degree of overlap of the ‘third dimension’ of warfare that the air element of modern strategy has often been a battleground between all branches of the armed services. Each has claimed the residual ‘right’ to own and operate heavier-than-air flying vehicles – generally known as aircraft, helicopters and missiles – independently of the other two.
