ABSTRACT

In the final part of the introduction (sections 1.4 and 1.5), the conclusion was reached that normative principles play an essential role in the evaluation and comparison of different states of affairs. Given that the liberty of all individuals remains unaffected, Rawls’s difference principle, for instance, states that one state is to be judged better than another if all individuals including the worst-off are better-off. In this context, ‘better-off’ refers to the individual’s supply of primary goods such as freedom to act, powers and opportunities, income and wealth, and self-respect. On the other hand, for one situation to be judged superior to another according to the utilitarian principle, an increase in average utility is sufficient. For a specification of utility, utilitarianism essentially refers to the satisfaction of needs, wants, and desires-that is, to a person’s happiness. Basically, in a comparison of two states of affairs, both principles would allow for a judgment as to which is better and which is worse; therefore, each (set of) normative principles can serve as a criterion of welfare-however, each of them can serve only for the society in which it holds. Of course, different principles will yield different judgments; and since individuals’ adoption of moral principles is a prerequisite for the capability to allow for making social welfare judgments, there will be as many judgments as normative principles are held. As a consequence, welfare judgments across societies employing different normative principles are possible only to the extent that the respective societies share at least those principles relevant for a specific comparison. Such common principles may exist in certain groups of related cultures but there are no general principles to which members of all societies could subscribe; therefore, direct judgments across all societies are impossible.