ABSTRACT
The aim of this chapter is to re-appraise and further articulate Popper’s views on metaphysics and the growth of knowledge through criticism. A prevailing Popperian view is that, while metaphysics as such does not form a part of science, it is a fruitful external source of scientifi c ideas. These scientifi c ideas are used in the construction of a theory which, according to the same prevailing view, is subject to strict falsifi cationism. We reject this prevailing view, and argue that disagreement and debate concerning the metaphysical core and heuristic power of different research programmes is a prerequisite for scientifi c progress. Moreover, in place of the rhetoric of strict falsifi cationism, we maintain that the clash of different research programmes competing for supremacy in the same arena defi nes the framework for scientifi c testing. To support this thesis we look at a number of disagreements in the history of science, namely Galileo versus Aristotelians on atomism, heliostaticism versus geostaticism, and general relativity versus nonrelativity views of gravitation. This analysis defi nes a framework as a family of rival research programmes and researchers working within the same framework may differ with respect to the heuristic power of such programmes. Our position is that researchers in this scenario may not only disagree, but do so, we argue, if there is to be a Popperian growth in knowledge through criticism.
