ABSTRACT
The final main trend we have identified concerns the numerous global corporations that continue to acquire ever-increasing stakes in their ASEAN JV operations yet refrain from buying them out completely. This is typified by the approach of Japanese MNCs such as Toyota and Mitsubishi, which have held back from buying their entire stakes in their respective JVs with Siam Cement for fear of losing Siam Cement’s connections and the access to contracts, licenses and other intangible benefits the loss might engender (Keenan, 1999). It would appear that the more developed the ASEAN economies become, the less value the local intermediary function has for the foreign partner. This is evidenced in Daimler-Chrysler’s recent effort to reduce the role of its long-term Singapore distributor, while still searching for local partners in lessdeveloped Asian countries. Corporate executives view local partners as being extremely useful within the initial two to three years of a local
project, helping to negotiate a way around the varied bureaucratic and political minefields that these countries often comprise. But as the business progresses, the MNC develops its “feel” for the local environment, reducing the influence of the local partner. Yet it is doubtful whether the overall “routing” of a local partner from an agreement makes any sense, even in a country such as Singapore, where local Chinese networks remain strongly in place and may reassert themselves as the region recovers. The only way executives say they would now contemplate such eventualities would be if, as well as their “fair” offering price, these local partners were able to give valid assurances as to their remaining as a “local friend” in years to come.
