ABSTRACT
What are the implications for two-level games of China’s current territorial disputes over the Spratly, Paracel, and other low-lying coral reefs, atolls, shoals, rocks and islands in the South China Sea? Popular irredentist sentiments, bureaucratic interests, trade direction and intensity, the strategies of negotiators, the different impact of costs and benefits on sectarian interests, institutional constraints, and the possibility of domestic restructuring of state priorities dominate the discussion of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku, Zhenbao/Damansky and McMahon Line/Aksai Chin disputes. These factors will figure prominently in any serious future attempt by disputing countries to resolve their sovereignty claims over the South China Sea islands. The search for regime legitimacy, and government efforts to manage pressure for democratization in Southeast Asian countries, will also be reflected in heightened sensitivity over national security and perceived threats to the state’s territorial integrity. Furthermore, the contest for influence between China’s foreign ministry establishment and its army and navy over foreign policy making and budget allocation should be carefully watched to see how this affects China’s posture in the South China Sea. However, the South China Sea also lies astride sea-lanes of strategic importance, and its sea-bed is potentially rich in hydrocarbons. As such, it is imperative that we take into account the role of transnational actors such as foreign oil companies or multilateral confidence-building institutions, and the activities of subnational actors, in influencing the actions of state leaders or government negotiators in preventing conflicts or settling claims. Indeed, the possible peacemaking role of (“Level III”) transnational actors such as foreign multinationals and non-governmental organizations in dispute situations must be more fully examined in future studies of domestic-international interactions than has been done in the past.
