ABSTRACT
One of the oldest and most enduring permanent features of relations between nations (earlier, other types of “entities” such as empires, city-states, etc.) is that of basing access, ad hoc or long-term, for military forces. Nowhere has this been better illustrated than by recent U.S. politico-diplomatic relations in relation first to the Gulf War, and then to the post-9/11 operations in Afghanistan, and then the invasion of Iraq. During the Gulf War, immediately following the end of the Cold War, U.S. forces were given access to bases and aircraft overflight corridors in a surprisingly comprehensive manner, not only by NATO and “moderate” Arab states such as Saudi Arabia, but by former Soviet-bloc antagonists, and by India. In the Afghanistan episode, crucial access for aircraft and intelligence operations was provided by, among other nations, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Pakistan, Turkey, Great Britain, Diego Garcia and the several exSoviet states of Central Asia: Kyrghizstan, Uzbekistan, Tadzikistan and Turkmenistan. But in the operation in Iraq, access was grudgingly given in Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Involved were a combination of factors: formal alliances, quid pro quo such as arms transfers and economic aid, political crosspressures on key states such as Saudi Arabia, international norms about preemptive military actions, and fear of retribution by Iraq and terrorist organizations.
