ABSTRACT
A metaphysical thesis, in the context of classical Indian philosophy at least, usually (more often than not) takes the form of such a proposition as 'Everything is F or 'Nothing is F\ Philosophical rivalry springs from the varieties of such proposed positions, that Is, varieties of suclrFs. For example, the Advaita Vedanta says, 'Everything is Brahman*, the Madhyamika, 'Everything is empty of its own-being or own-nature', and the Yogacara, 'Everything is a vijhapti making of consciousness'. We may add to the list even such positions as 'Everything is non-soul, impsrmanent and suffering' (the Buddhist in general), and 'Everything is knowable and namable' (the Nyaya-Vai£e§ika). If we have to add the Jainas to the list, then we can say that their position is: Everything is 'non-one-sided' anekanta. However, I shall argue that at least on one standard interpretation, the Jaina thesis is held at a slightly different level; if the others are called metaphysical, this one may be called meta-metaphysical. The sense of it will be clear later on. I do not wish to claim this to be the'one-upmanship'of the Jainas. The claim here is a modest one; it harks back to the historical origin of the position.
