ABSTRACT
This article demonstrates that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a
limited role to play in counter-insurgency (COIN). The analysis focuses on the stra-
tegic relevance of NATO for counter-insurgency and describes its contributions in the
Balkans. It then applies this framework to the war in Afghanistan. The assessment
shows that NATO’s strategic value is undermined by its own institutional rules and
procedures. Moreover, while NATO has adapted considerably to the post-Cold
War environment, it has not focused serious attention on tactical assets needed for
counter-insurgency. Consequently, when NATO assumed control of military oper-
ations in Afghanistan in 2006, expectations of success were not realistic. Lessons
can be gathered from NATO’s experience, so in theory further adaptation might be
considered. However, this article shows that in reality, NATO’s primary COIN func-
tion is limited to operating under a narrow remit to defuse the conditions from which
insurgency grows – and that a willingness among the NATO members to undertake
such engagements is rare.
