ABSTRACT
Any attempt to anticipate how the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would act in a world where the market in energy ceased to operate – that is, any attempt to assess Beijing’s energy-security strategy – must first acknowledge critical uncertainties concerning the future of energy technology and the PRC’s economic and political trajectory. Among these uncertainties, even though alternative energy prospects hold some promise, material claims about the composition of China’s future energy needs or vulnerabilities can be advanced with the greatest degree of confidence. Barring a major economic contraction, shifts in technology that dramatically reduce the consumption of fossil fuels, or the discovery of substantial new Chinese energy reserves, the PRC’s future external requirements will center around oil, of which China became a net importer in 1993, and gas, of which it will be a net importer by about 2010 if current trends away from coal and toward gas-fueled power generation persist.1
