ABSTRACT
Professor Hayek states on page 20 of his work The Fatal Conceit that ‘reluctant as we may be to accept this, no universally valid system of ethics can ever be known to us’. In this brief comment we aim to criticize this claim on the part of Professor Hayek and, in turn, to expound a theory of the compatibility of three different levels of approach to the study of this same human reality. A first level of approach would be constituted by what Hayek, following
Hume, terms ‘conjectural history’.2 Conjectural history consists in interpreting the processes of evolution and in analysing their results (customs, morals, laws and institutions). This first area of research has its origin in the tradition that begins with Montesquieu and Hume and culminates in Hayek’s most significant works, and especially in The Fatal Conceit. This level of approach is highly multidisciplinary and must inc1ude studies from sociology, political science, anthropology, etc. In short, this approach to the study of human reality is the first to have sprung up in the history of scientific thought, and it aims to explain the evolution and emergence of ‘real or positive law’. The main risk facing the researcher in this area lies in how easy it is to commit errors when it comes to interpreting the phenomena of historical evolution, especially when an erroneous theory is used, either implicitly or explicitly, in this process of interpretation. The second level of approach to the study of human reality emerges much
later in time, with the appearance of economic science towards the end of the eighteenth century and culminating in the contributions of the Austrian School of Economics, which focuses its scientific research programme on the formal study of the spontaneous and dynamic processes resulting from human interaction. This level consists, therefore, in the development of a formal theory of the social processes, or, if you prefer, in the attempt to rationalize these social processes in a detailed manner. This second field of research gives rise to praxeology (a formal theory of social processes), which has its beginnings with Menger, continues with Mises and is even developed by Hayek himself in his earlier works and more recently by the members of the Neo-Austrian School. In Montesquieu’s terminology this second level of approach would aim to discover in a rational way the laws of nature in the
social field. The main risk in this second level of approach (constituted by economic science) lies in what Hayek terms constructivism, as it is extremely easy for the economist to fall into the error of not restricting himself to interpreting and studying the social process logically and formally, but instead falling into the fatal conceit of believing it possible and advisable to use this knowledge to rebuild and design society ex novo. Finally, the third level of approach would consist in the development of a
formal theory of social ethics. This level of approach is precisely what Hayek appears to deny in the quotation inc1uded at the outset of this commentary. Yet we believe that, just as we can progress in the rationalization of the social processes (economics), it is possible to carry out a certain formal rationalization of social ethics. We would therefore be engaged in the discovery and justification of ‘natural law’, thereby following the tradition of Locke, which has found continuation today in such authors as Nozick and Rothbard. Naturally, as was the case with economics, the main risk in this third level of approach lies in constructivism. However, this should not lead us to give up directly attempts to rationalize a formal theory of social ethics, insofar as it lies within our scope. Thus, one has the levels of real or positive law, the law of nature and natural law, understood (respectively) by conjectural history, praxeology and the formal theory of ethics. Each level is complementary to the others; each also has its dangers (theoretical error for the first level, constructivism for the second and third). In this respect, an important practical rule may be to be on one’s guard whenever the rationalist conc1usions of the second and third level seem to be in open contradiction with the conc1usions of the first level (conjectural history). In this case, one will have to take the utmost care not to fall into constructivism. Hayek’s work is especially praiseworthy for its contributions both in the
second level (economic theory) and in the first level (the theory of evolution and the critique of constructivism). However, we feel that it could have been enriched even further if Professor Hayek had, on a supplementary basis, applied his ample wisdom to the third level (the theory of social ethics).
