ABSTRACT
According to the arguments and evidence presented so far, business lobbyists base their decision to lobby on the expected costs and benefits of lobbying, including considerations about the likelihood of success. In practice, this involves balancing the expected costs in terms of campaign expenses and possible damage to reputation against the expected benefits of averting an unfavourable policy or attaining a desired one. The case study on small business banking in the previous chapter suggests that policymakers will be more likely to override business’ messages if, ceteris paribus, they have relatively little to lose from incorrectly dismissing as idle babble what might really be an informative signal. This condition would be given, for example, in the case of individual legislators nearing term limits or retirement, as well as for those whose incumbent government is enjoying a postelection honeymoon period during which the extent to which they attract blame for undesirable socio-political developments is generally limited (MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson 1992). Policymakers also have reduced incentives to heed business’ advice if they have invested heavily in their reputation with regard to a particular issue, be that advancing the fate of the working class, fighting for a cleaner environment or whatever other issue happens to feature centrally in their election platform.
