ABSTRACT
While little seemed to disturb the routine of the last years of the old training ship in the tranquil waters of the River Dart, it was clear that by the late 1890s the wider naval world was changing fast. For much of the lifetime of the Britannia British naval supremacy had reined supreme but by the end of the century new rivals in the shape of the United States, Japan and particularly Germany, had appeared. Inspired by the writings of American naval officer A T Mahan, which stressed the connection between sea power and predominance in world affairs, new navies now attempted to emulate what they saw as the building blocks of previous British success. Naval victories for the United States in the Spanish American War of 1898 and for the Japanese in their contest with the Russian navy at Tsushima in 1905, and the political advantages that followed, seemed to provide tangible evidence of the validity of Mahan’s theories and as a major imperial power Britain viewed the expansion of navies in distant waters with considerable concern. But it was maritime matters closer to home, in particular the rise of the new German navy, that created the most pressing problems for the Admiralty. In 1897 Kaiser Wilhelm II appointed Admiral Alfred Tirpitz as head of the Imperial Navy Office and from this point onwards the Germans enthusiastically pursued plans for a naval fleet that would challenge Britain for world dominance and serve as a symbol of national prestige. To some extent the particular British problem, an imperial power faced with an immediate localised threat, could be solved by diplomatic realignment with competitors France, Russia and Japan but tensions remained and as long as the rival High Seas Fleet exercised in the North Sea, a major reorientation of British naval policy could hardly be avoided.
