ABSTRACT
The Soviet attitude and policies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict were primarily, if not wholly, a function of the Cold War. Soviet policies towards the parties involved were first and foremost dictated by global considerations, even as regional and local factors were, obviously, taken into account. Attitudes towards peace or war, and continued conflict or settlement were determined not by animosity towards one side or another, sympathy or even ideology, but rather by calculations related to East-West relations and risks. Indeed, the high-risk nature of the conflict, due to the involvement, and at times commitment, of both superpowers, was perhaps the major factor in Soviet decision-making with regard to the conflict. Obviously, other factors and considerations were at play: the state of their relations with the Arab states, interests elsewhere in the Third World (themselves linked to the Cold War); domestic factors, including differences of opinion – or interests – within the Soviet establishment (within the military as well as perhaps between military and other institutions); changing economic interests; and even upon occasion the Sino-Soviet dispute. Yet, given these factors and even the overriding global (Cold War)
consideration, the Arab-Israeli conflict itself did not take particularly high priority in Soviet foreign policy except in times of increased tension or actual warfare in the region. Moscow’s Arab partners, including local Communist parties as well as the Arab countries and movements, were well aware of the priority of global interests and the secondary nature of their cause(s) in the dominant Soviet position. At the same time, there were apparently those in the Kremlin who opposed such priorities in the interest of promoting ideological or other considerations rather than Cold War or at least purely strategic considerations. Similarly, there were significantly different policy preferences between those who supported and those who opposed continuation of the Cold War itself. And all of these differences had ramifications for policies towards the ArabIsraeli conflict. Ultimately, with Gorbachev’s ascension to power and his abandonment of the Cold War, the Soviet attitude towards the conflict underwent its final transformation.
