ABSTRACT
The 1970s witnessed two important shifts in American nuclear strategy. First, whereas earlier doctrines-most notably ‘‘Massive Retaliation’’ in the 1950s and the theory of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) of the 1960s-stressed an all-out response by US nuclear forces against the Soviet Union if nuclear war erupted, the strategies of the 1970s stressed the need for a more limited use of nuclear weapons, tailored to the particular scenario at hand. Second, the emphasis on which targets to attack also shifted. The MAD theory of the 1960s had emphasized inflicting considerable damage on Soviet population and industry as the cornerstone of American deterrent policy, with considerably less emphasis on Soviet political and military targets per se. This emphasis on countervalue (targeting an enemy’s means of economic and societal cohesion) shifted to counterforce (targeting an enemy’s armed forces, with considerable emphasis on his nuclear forces). There were several reasons for this shift. The technological develop-
ments of the 1960s, most particularly the multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV), combined with vastly improved guidance for ballistic missiles, began to make themselves felt during the 1970s. These developments gave strategists and statesmen the ability to adapt more flexible nuclear postures, which could be critical during a superpower crisis. The massive build-up of Soviet strategic forces from 1965 meant that the credibility of MAD was questionable in the face of Soviet nuclear forces that were now more numerous, sophisticated, and flexible. A strategy aimed at reducing this threat in the event of hostilities, and of limiting damage to the United States while maintaining the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent for its allies abroad, appeared to be in order.
