ABSTRACT
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 134 Contemporary Threat and Risk Overview..................................................................................... 135 Current Elevated-Risk Waters ....................................................................................................... 137 ISPS Code and the SUA Convention and the Security of Tankers, FPSOs,
FSOs, Drillships, and Fixed Platforms ............................................................................... 138 ISPS Code ........................................................................................................................... 138 SUA Convention ................................................................................................................. 140
Crude and Product Tanker Vulnerability and Security ................................................................. 142 Overview: VLCCs and ULCCs .......................................................................................... 142 Evolving Refi ning Hubs and Product Tanker Fleet Development and Trade:
Implications for Potential Security Risk? ................................................................ 144 Product Tanker Design and Operation ............................................................................... 145 VLCC, ULCC, and Product Tanker Vulnerability ............................................................. 146
FSO, FPSO, and Drillship Vulnerability and Security .................................................................. 148 Floating Storage and Off-loading Units ............................................................................. 149 Floating Production, Storage, and Off-loading Units ......................................................... 149 Drillships ............................................................................................................................ 151
Terminal Vulnerability and Security ............................................................................................. 152 Khawr Al Amaya Oil Terminal and Al Basrah Oil Terminal ............................................ 153 Vulnerabilities..................................................................................................................... 154 Single-Point Moorings ........................................................................................................ 155
Conclusion ...................................................................................................................................... 155 Notes ............................................................................................................................................. 156
When viewed in a holistic sense, from the perspective of the global trade of petroleum by sea, where the vast majority of cargoes are transported safely, the security of the maritime environment is in a generally healthy state. This is important to consider when tackling issues relating to the security of tankers, fl oating production units, and coastally situated infrastructure, because dramatic headlines relating to piracy attacks against tankers and the aforementioned infrastructure can sometimes give the erroneous impression that threat levels are endemically high and worsening. For the most part, this is not the case. However, unfortunately, some regional concerns persist. One maritime area, for example, that continues to warrant constant vigilance is the offshore exploration and production area off the Nigerian coast, where tankers, offshore support vessels, and production facilities continue to be regularly attacked by well-armed militants and pirates. In a recent high-profi le incident in June 2008, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) guerrillas managed to attack the Shell-operated fl oating production, storage and off-loading unit (FPSO), Bonga, which was located 75 Nmi from the coast. On a broader scale, it is also important to bear in mind that this “operational-level” security perspective is not the only level of concern. Governments must always continue to plan for the implications of possible “strategic-scale” petroleum supply disruptions in the event of a wider intra-or interstate confl ict in an oil-producing region.
