ABSTRACT
Even were one to concede that the jihadists of today lack the will or capability to engage in large-scale acts of terror using chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons, this says very little about the jihadists of tomorrow. After all, if their actions over the past decade have taught us anything, it is that jihadists are audaciously nimble operators who will adapt to survive and are prepared to persevere sine die to attain their goals. At the same time, the global system in which they operate is not standing still-the political, rhetorical, and, perhaps most important, technological landscape is continually reshaping itself into novel and unexpected topologies that might present both obstacles and opportunities for the purveyors of jihad. The future relationship between jihadists and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is thus a crucial issue, albeit one that forces the unwary analyst to venture onto the treacherous terrain of forecasting. The prudent commentator might wish to demur on such matters, yet the alternative to a judicious inquiry into the problem is to sit on the sidelines with a smug fatalism and provide hollow critiques after disaster has struck. Indeed, it is arguably the moral obligation of all those who study the domains of jihadism or WMD to explore the nebulous horizons of WMD terrorism-no matter how difficult this may prove-in pursuit of insights that might assist in preventing or planning for the unthinkable.
