ABSTRACT
I.. Introduction The 1980s and 1990s was an era of unprecedented subsidies for sports facilities. Arlington (Texas), Baltimore, Chicago, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dallas, Detroit, Green Bay, Jacksonville, Milwaukee, Phoenix, Seattle, St. Louis, St. Petersburg, Tampa, and Toronto raised taxes to ensure teams would call their communities home. These tax increases repaid the bonds sold to pay for the public sector’s share of the cost of building the new facilities. With the teams given control of all of the new revenue generated from luxury seating, naming and sponsorship rights, and the expanded retail venues included in these new facilities, they had the revenue needed to repay any debt they incurred. As Forbes would report each year, the
additional revenue also substantially increased the value of each team creating an opportunity for owners to realize a substantial return on the money they invested to buy the team. In no instance did a public sector partner receive a commitment or assurance that new private investments would be made to produce additional tax dollars. Each city could follow in Indianapolis’ footsteps and put forward a plan and then actively broker additional deals for new development that might generate new tax revenues to offset their investment. While each city assured residents they would try to enhance development and secure new taxes, in essence taxpayers were left to “hope” something positive in terms of real estate development and new tax revenues would occur. Deals like that would not work in San Diego.
