ABSTRACT

Historically, reproof has not been our legal system’s response to domestic abuse (Lemon, 1996). For centuries authorities and the law tolerated, if not lauded, a husband’s violence against his wife, as long as the husband’s beating was a form of chastisement addressing an alleged offense by his spouse. Only when anger served as the motivation for the beating did a husband’s violence toward his spouse garner criticism. Authorities disapproved of beatings out of anger because they viewed the husband’s conduct as an abuse of his status, not because of concerns for the well-being of the wife (Amussen, 1994). It was not until the 1960s and the birth of a women’s rights movement that the issue of domestic violence received national attention in the United States. It was only 40 years ago that our legal system acknowledged domestic violence as a serious harm and proscribed domestic violence as conduct in conflict with the law. Since that time the U.S. Supreme Court, the Congress, our state courts and legislatures have all promulgated a body of criminal, tort, and family laws that almost universally condemn domestic violence (Schneider, 2002). The path to condemnation, however, has been far from what could be considered a well-worn route (Lemon, 1996). While the last four decades have resulted in incredible social change in domestic violence law, the path of our nation’s domestic violence policy more closely resembles one akin to an obstacle course.