ABSTRACT
During the late 1990s, Indonesia-the world’s most populous Muslim nation-began a transition from authoritarian rule. At the time, many commentators expressed concern about the security threat posed by militant Islamists in the wake of Suharto’s downfall (Bandoro, 2001, pp. 333-7; Bandoro, 2002, pp. 234-6; Crouch, 2000, pp. 115-33; Gershman, 2002; Hasan, 2002, pp. 4-18). Initially, the archipelago witnessed a proliferation of Islamist paramilitary groups.* Yet, during the decade that followed the transition, the worst-case scenarios have failed to eventuate and proved to be largely unfounded. Indonesia today, in coordination with international partners, has reduced its potential threat environment at least strategically. This outcome raises some interesting questions: Has Indonesia really contained its paramilitary/extremist threat? If so, how and what lessons, if any, can we draw? Attempting to answer these questions requires a closer look at the nature of the security threat and responses to it.
