ABSTRACT

This chapter aims to answer the puzzle of whether Pakistan is actually racing for balance or parity when it comes to its deterrent force development, vis-à-vis its adversary India, after nearly two decades of the nuclearization of South Asia. It discusses the challenges posed to the broader contours of minimum deterrence in South Asia. While evaluating Pakistan’s evolving nuclear policy, this chapter conceptualizes under the essentials of minimum deterrence that if Pakistan tries to achieve a parity level, that is, procure a larger number of deterrent forces, sophisticated delivery systems such as heavy bombers, aircraft carriers, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, and even Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) which may go beyond Indian specificity, then it may not remain consistent with the minimum deterrence Pakistan conceptualized earlier. However, if Pakistan merely strives for a balance as part of its strategic compulsion, such as producing effective countermeasures it perceives is required in order to prevent the total erosion of deterrence in South Asia, then its nuclear policy could remain consistent with the minimum deterrence conceived here.