ABSTRACT
When the Multinational Force (MNF) came under attack from Syrian-backed antigovemment militias during the fight for the approaches to Beirut in September 1983, American and French units countered with artillery and naval and air gunfire, prompting senior American officers to urge the creation of a combined command and staff. A combined command would complicate France’s political desire to distance itself from certain US policies. The peacekeeping situation was complicated by Syria’s vehement opposition to the May 17, 1983, Israel-Lebanon withdrawal agreement which had been negotiated under American sponsorship. More to the point of the peacekeeping utility of the MNF, and particularly the American component, hostility to the American military presence by Syrian-backed Lebanese factions mounted throughout the second half of 1983. The Gemayel government wanted the MNF to stay as reinforcement and “psychological security”; Syria wanted it to leave along with other “foreign forces.”
