ABSTRACT
The increased outward thrust of the Soviet state in foreign affairs, not only the primary imperative of Marxist-Leninist dogma, but also a kind of high-risk compensation for Russian national consciousness and culture repressed by domestic ideocracy. The analogy does, however, apply to the Soviet politcal command to a degree that it might even be said that Marxism-Leninism is the obsession of the systemic "soul" of the party-state. The rejection in Marxism-Leninism of transcendent grounds for legitimacy has necessitated in practice the projection of godlike leaders who make no mistakes and who have in their own genius the power to guide humanity into the future. Yet the danger of an alternative to party leadership arising out of the military and nationalistically-oriented elements in the administrative elite is ever present in the background of Soviet politics. Both the Khrushchev and Brezhnev regimes, in different ways and in turn, have sought to repair the weakness of the party-state's foundation.
