ABSTRACT
This introduction presents an overview of the key concepts discussed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The book argues that analytical philosophy and radical theory alike stand in an ambivalent relationship with skepticism. The therapy appropriate to psycho-philosophical disorder consists partly in painting a picture of an alternative, uncolored by the hue of objectivity that characterizes the neurosis, and partly in bringing the philosopher's substantive assumptions about the perceived explanatory tasks of philosophy to consciousness wherever an epistemic neurosis shows its influence. In a compelling critique of traditional epistemology, Michael Williams has argued that we must distinguish between two different kinds of diagnostic critique in philosophy: therapeutic and theoretical. Hilary Putnams reliance on an "interactive" conception of reference—one that treats reference as an internal relation between word and object—draws attention to a crucial distinction for the philosophical therapist: the distinction between concepts that are appropriate objects for explanatory theories and concepts that is not.
