ABSTRACT
The leadership struggle that rent the Chinese Communist Party for so long seemed in the first weeks after Mao's death to have been resolved in favor of the moderate faction and its policies. Basic to the resurgence of the moderates after the Cultural Revolution and their quick victory over the radicals in the wake of Mao's death is China's need for the pragmatic domestic and foreign policies they have espoused. Triumph by the radical faction in the post-Mao power struggle would almost have undermined Sino-Southeast Asian relations. An increased emphasis on ideology would have almost inevitably exacerbated Sino-Soviet hostility and endangered the partial detente between Peking and Washington. The ability of Southeast Asian governments to cope with Communist insurgencies will depend more and more on their ability to meet pressing domestic economic and social problems. The People's Republic of China's relations with the Communist states of Indochina are influenced by Sino-Soviet rivalry than are its relations with their non-Communist neighbors.
