ABSTRACT
This report provides a summary of a model of decision-making in Soviet defense to clarify issues and identify points of disagreements and misunderstanding by Western analysts. This paper is organized around problems observed in some of the literature on Soviet defense decision-making and in informal statements and comments on the subject. These problems include inappropriate and confused imputations of influences, effects, and relationships in the flow of the decision process. Two levels of the decisionmaking process — high-level and low-level — and their patterns of behavior are examined. The high-level process is composed of the Politburo, Central Committee Secretariat, and Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The low-level includes the production ministries, Defense Ministry, and Party organizations below the Central Committee. The report suggests that the progress made in understanding Soviet defense decision-making can help unify the several existing models used to explain not only Soviet decision-making but decision-making in general.
