ABSTRACT
The United States, the first nuclear weapons state, sought to keep secret the designs for its nuclear explosives as well as the means by which it created special nuclear materials for its weapons. Despite lengthening the list of items controlled and tightening the application of controls through licensing and oversight, nuclear export controls—and supply-side policies in general—do not stop nuclear proliferation. Argentina decided not to continue supplying technology to potential proliferants and joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group in December 1992. The single greatest shortcoming of supply-side policies is their failure to address the motivations underlying proliferation. It is conceivable that supply-side policies may indirectly promote proliferation. As the availability of items on the Nuclear Suppliers Group list shrinks, the prices consumers are willing to pay may rise. Supply-side policies should not be abandoned. Classification of technical information as well as export controls both play a constructive role in delaying nations’ efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.
