ABSTRACT

The "Syrian crisis" of 1957, sparked by a covert attempt by the Eisenhower administration to overthrow what it perceived to be an emerging Soviet client state in the Middle East, represented the denouement of a badly misguided U.S. foreign policy, according to David Lesch. The repercussions of this incident, which almost precipitated a superpower c

chapter 1|16 pages

Introduction

chapter 2|12 pages

American Policy Under Truman

chapter 3|14 pages

Eisenhower’s Turn

chapter 4|18 pages

The Swinging of the Pendulum in Syria

chapter 5|19 pages

Syria’s Choice

chapter 6|24 pages

Policy Fragmentation

chapter 7|23 pages

Prelude to the 1957 Crisis

chapter 9|35 pages

The American Riposte

chapter 10|17 pages

Regional Diplomacy of Sa’ud and Nasser

chapter 11|20 pages

The International Crisis

chapter 12|5 pages

Conclusion