ABSTRACT
Deterrence depends on numerous and, often, indeterminate nonquantitative considerations—the domestic and international political, economic and military vulnerabilities of the actors and the uncertainties about one’s own capabilities as well as those of an adversary. The economic, agricultural and demographic vulnerabilities described confront the leaders of the Soviet Union with a particularly acute dilemma. In evaluating the domestic and military problems and vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union, various analysts have seized upon the shortcomings over the last 65 years to predict the demise of the Soviet state. American complacency stemming from an overemphasis on Soviet vulnerabilities would be imprudent and, potentially, cataclysmic. The Soviet vulnerabilities described as well as the political climates in the United States and Europe make the present a propitious time to pursue arms control with the Soviet Union. In addition to questions about Soviet strategic capabilities and doctrinal uncertainties, Soviet planners cannot be sure of the US response in a pre-emptive scenario.
