ABSTRACT
In Alexander M. Bickel's judgment, Congress ought to do more reviewing and rewriting of its laws in light of their administration rather than attempt to reshape and redirect their administration. Throughout the course of the legislative veto's history, governmental and legal scholars have been divided in their assessment of the veto's constitutionality. The legislative veto, as an oversight tool available to House and Senate committees, might serve to strengthen the "Iron Triangle" or "Subsystem Politics" which presently exist among legislative subcommittees, regulatory agencies, and the regulated community. The relationship among the members of the trilogy is cultivated by close cooperation on policy matters from which an inevitable single perspective emerges. In Clark v. Valeo, the court declined to reach the merits of the constitutionality of the veto issue on ripeness grounds, because the veto power has not as yet been exercised by Congress over the Federal Elections Commission.
