ABSTRACT
This chapter analyzes the role of political variables in the decisions to lend to Communist members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). It examines whether the relationship of international financial organizations and the developing states is a reciprocal one in actuality or only in appearance. The Soviet Bloc members of the IMF and IBRD do very well in a cursory examination of aggregate lending figures from both organiza-tions. Both the lending organization and the borrower desire the technocratic arena to be as large as possible, with little weight assigned to political inputs, without reducing the amount of aid extended. The characteristics of the political arena in any given case will affect the borrower's decisions regarding its future relationship with the lender. Ascriptive factors are derived from the domestic economic and political charac-teristics of the borrower. These factors determine to which arena the borrower is assigned by the lender.
