ABSTRACT
Syria's unwillingness and incapacity to extend the army's control over the whole of Lebanon have contributed to a situation of de facto partition of Lebanon, which the Syrians so much feared at the time of the outbreak of the civil war. The Syrians have had difficulty in setting up an effective central Lebanese government under Syrian protection which would serve as an effective instrument of Syrian policies in Lebanon. Despite Syria's impressive achievements in the Lebanese War, then, and notwithstanding its recent achievements in toppling Michel Aoun, the interim assessment of Syria's involvement in Lebanon in its totality is negative. This involvement, which was intended to promote the ambitions of the Hafez al-Assad regime at home and abroad, achieved the opposite result and became a stumbling block for Syria. The Syrian regime has not yet succeeded, however, in transforming the achievements into permanent political-strategic advantages, or in imposing a Syrian order on the Lebanese.
