ABSTRACT
For reasons of history and politics that are familiar to most, strategic defense until was relegated to the backwaters of the strategic debate on both sides of the Atlantic. North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) strategy of flexible response cast US strategic offensive weapons in a special role. Deterrence rests on NATO’s capacity and will for three levels of response: direct defense, deliberate escalation, and general nuclear response. The chapter examines some of the technical requirements for Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), with particular emphasis on defending against the threat to NATO allies. It addresses two other political aspects of the issue: the impact of SDI on arms control and the nature of the European debate about the SDI. Aircraft and cruise missiles—not to mention “suitcase bombs” and other esoteric means of delivery—could be effective penetrators of any SDI shield, and hence the SDI will not in itself relieve either superpower from a requirement for strategic offensive deterrent forces.
